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Market risk premia vary over time and their fluctuations are a major cause of market volatility.
But what drive the changes in risk premia?  The standard rational expectations equilibrium answer
relates changes in risk premia to changes in information about fundamental conditions which correctly
alter the market’s assessment of future risky events. The most important among these are business cycle
events. This reasoning implies that excess returns are predictable by changes in observed fundamental
conditions and market volatility can be explained by such information. This conclusion is rejected by the
data. Fluctuations in asset prices cannot be well explained by news about fundamental factors and, as
Samuelson used to quip, the market will forecast eleven of the next five recessions.
The alternative perspective holds that, in addition to fundamental conditions, the bulk of asset
returns’ volatility is caused by fluctuations in market belief. We hold the view that agents do not know
the true dynamics of the economy since it is a non-stationary system with time varying structure that
changes faster than can be learned with precision. Hence diverse beliefs is a simple consequence of lack
of full knowledge. With diverse beliefs a large proportion of market volatility is endogenously
generated. This component is called Endogenous Uncertainty (see, Kurz (1974)). A sample of papers
includes Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985), (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), Detemple and
Murthy (1994), Kurz (1974) , (1994), (1997a), (1997b),  Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Motolese
(2001), Kurz Jin and Motolese (2005a) (2005b), Kurz and Wu (1996), Motolese (2001), (2003),
Nielsen (1996), (2003), Wu and Guo (2003), (2004). In particular Kurz and Motolese (2001) and Kurz
Jin and Motolese (2005a) demonstrate via simulations that Endogenous Uncertainty contributes a big
2component to the equity premium and leads to stochastic volatility. However, these papers study the 
structure of volatility and risk premia only via simulations of computed equilibria. They do not study the
determinants of market risk premia either analytically or empirically. In this paper we focus on factors
which contribute to risk premia. More specifically, we study the relationship between market belief and
the structure of risk premia. If belief dynamics cause Endogenous Uncertainty how does the structure
of belief affect the equilibrium risk premia? We derive analytical results which we then test empirically
by employing new data measuring the market distribution of beliefs. Market belief data are extracted
from observations on monthly forecasts of future interest rates and macro economic variables
compiled by the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BLUF) since 1983. Since we study an economy where
agents hold diverse probability beliefs and since a risk premium of an asset over the riskless rate is the
conditional expectation of excess returns of the asset, there are many subjectively perceived risk premia
in such economies. We thus need to sort through the measurement problem of risk premia.
The literature on excess returns and risk premia is large. We mention only a few papers which
report on convincing evidence gathered in recent years against the expectations hypothesis (e.g. Fama
and Bliss (1987), Stambaugh (1988), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004)). These show that investments in Treasury securities generate large
predictable excess returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) exhibit predictable excess holding returns in
bond markets while Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) find excess returns in two futures markets: Fed Funds
futures in 1988:10 - 2003:12 and Eurodollar futures in 1985:Q2-2003:Q4. “Predictability” is used here
in the sense of exhibiting long term statistical correlation between current information and future excess
returns. Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2004) do not estimate structural
models to explain the source of excess returns but deduce such returns from estimated reduced form
models for forecasting returns. Broadly speaking they argue that bond excess returns are associated
with business cycles and for this reason they use pro-cyclical variables such as current yields or year
over year growth rate of Non Farm Payroll (in short NFP) to predict excess returns. 
Our results confirm earlier conclusions regarding the effect of cyclical variables on risk premia.
However, using our alternative perspective we show that conditional risk premia also contain a large
endogenous component generated by the dynamics of the market state of belief. We call it “The Market
Belief Risk Premium.” This component is orthogonal to the observed “fundamental” variables used on
3the above studies. The term “orthogonal” highlights the fact that pure belief is a variable which is
measured net of all observed variables and has its own dynamic low of motion. This endogenous
component reflects investor’s pure perceived risks of future returns - net of all fundamental information
- and this includes perceived risk of future market’s beliefs itself. Although interest rates fluctuate with
business cycles, large fluctuations of asset prices and interest rates are generated endogenously by
market beliefs about future events, including future market beliefs.
The main results of this paper consist of two parts. First we show analytically and empirically
that a large proportion of market fluctuations and risk premia are generated endogenously by the
dynamics of market beliefs. These beliefs are entirely rational since in a non-stationary and changing
economy investors cannot learn the true dynamics of return and hence often adopt beliefs which are
wrong but which cannot be falsified by existing data. Under diverse beliefs the market often moves too
high or too low resulting in large time variability of risk premia. Second, our most striking result shows
that the market belief has a clear effect on the risk premium. When the market holds abnormally
favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset (e.g. future interest rates or dividend payments) the
market views the long position as less risky and consequently the risk premium on holding that asset
falls. Hence, fluctuations in risk premia are inversely related to the degree of market optimism about
future prospects of asset payoffs. We test our conclusion empirically in futures and bonds markets and
show that this effect is very strong and empirically very dominant.  
1.  Asset Pricing Under Heterogenous Beliefs  
1.1 An Illustrative Decision Model
Consider an asset or a portfolio of assets whose market price is , paying an exogenous riskypt
sequence { }. Let  be the interest rate,  and let excess return over the risklessDt , t'1 ,2 ,... rt Rt'1% rt
rate be . The risk premium over the riskless is the conditional expectations of(1/pt)(pt%1%Dt%1&Rtpt)
excess return. Since it is a function of equilibrium prices, a risk premium - as a function of the state
variables - is best deduced from equilibrium prices. With this in mind, the model below is used to
deduce a closed form solution of the asset price map so as to enable us to study the factors which
determine the risk premium. To obtain closed form solutions we use a model which is very common in
the literature on Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (e.g. Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy
4 It would be more realistic to assume the values Dt  grow and the growth rate of the values has a mean µ rather than
the values themselves. This added realism is useful when we motivate the empirical model later but is not essential for the
analytic development.
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and McNichols (1989), Wang (1994), He and Wang (1995), Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) and others
cited in Brunnermeier (2001)). We thus make strong assumptions but these are justified by the fact that
the model helps clarify the main ideas. Once explained, we show that our results are fully general. There
is one problem we need to address at the outset. Our agents do not know the true probability  of the
Πˆ
payoff process  { } and hold diverse probability beliefs about . The fact that there areDt , t ' 1 ,2 , . . . Πˆ
many subjective risk premia in the market raises two immediate questions that will be the basis of our
development in the next two sections. First, why do agents not know the probability ? Second, whatΠˆ
is the common knowledge basis of all agents in an economy with diverse beliefs? 
Starting with the second question our unequivocal answer is past data on observables. The
economy has a set of observable variables and  is one of them. Agents have a long history of theDt
observables, allowing rich statistical analysis. Given the data, all compute the same finite dimensional
distributions of the observations and hence all know the same empirical moments. Using standard
extension of measures they deduce from the data a unique empirical probability measure on infinite
sequences which is denoted by . It can be shown that   is stationary (see Kurz (1994)) and we callmˆ mˆ
it “the stationary measure.” This is the empirical knowledge shared by all agents. We assume that the
long run empirical data reveals that the ‘s constitute a Markov process and they are conditionallyDt
normally distributed with mean   and variance 4. The unique empirical probability  isµ%λd(Dt&µ) σ
2
d mˆ
common knowledge. To simplify define  and note that { } is then a zero meandt ' Dt & µ dt , t'1 ,2 ,...
process with unknown true probability Π and a stationary empirical probability m. Keeping in mind the
question of why m and Π are not the same, we now turn to the second question. 
Our economy has undergone changes in technology, social organization and attitudes. These
changes are rapid with profound economic effects which induce changes in asset productivity and
management. Consequently, the process { } is  non-stationary. Although this means thedt , t'1 ,2 ,...
distributions of the ‘s are time dependent, it is far more than saying that { } constitutes adt dt , t'1 ,2 ,...
sequence of productivity “regimes.” It requires recognition that although assets pay in some unit of
account, assets and commodities used as payoff are different over time. Such time variability makes it
impossible to learn the unknown true probability Π. The stationary probability  m  is then merely an
5average over an infinite sequence of changing regimes. It reflects long term frequencies but it is not the
true probability of the process. Belief diversity starts with the fact that agents disagree over the meaning
of public information. They believe  Π  is different from m and they construct models to express the
implications they see in the data. Being common knowledge, the stationary probability  m is a reference
for any concept of rationality. We may disagree with an agent and regard his model as “extreme” but
we can declare it irrational only if it is contradicted by the data. Hence, any rationality requirement must
insist a model does not contradict the evidence summed up by the probability  m. 
Turning now to our infinite horizon model, at date t  agent i buys   shares of stock and
θ
i
t
receives the payment  for each of  held. We assume the riskless rate is constant over time sodt%µ θ
i
t&1
that there is a technology by which an agent can invest the amount Bt at date t and receive with
certainty the amount  BtR  at date t+1. The definition of consumption is then standard
.c it ' θ
i
t&1 [pt % dt % µ] % B
i
t&1 R & θ
i
t pt & B
i
t
Equivalently, define wealth  and derive the familiar transition of wealthW it 'c
i
t %θ
i
tpt%B
i
t
(1a)     .W it%1' (W
i
t &c
i
t )R%θ
i
tQt%1 , Qt%1'pt%1% (dt%1%µ )&Rpt
 is excess returns. Given some initial values  the agent maximizes the expected utility Qt (θ
i
0 , W
i
0 )
 (1b)    U ' E it
(θi , c i)
[
j
4
s ' 0
&β
t%s&1e
&( 1
τ
c it%s)
| Ht]
subject to a vector of yet unspecified state variables   and their transitions. Both are specified later. 
ψ
i
t
 is date t information consisting of known values of observable variables. We recognize theHt
limitations of the exponential utility and use it as a good vehicle to explain the main ideas, hence the
term “illustrative” in the title of this Section. After we deduce the closed form solution of equilibrium
risk premium we show how to generalize the main results.  
To proceed we state an assumption and a conjecture. First, we assume the agent believes the
payoff process { } is conditionally normal. Second, we conjecture that given the statedt , t'1 ,2 ,...
variables of the economy, equilibrium price  is conditionally normally distributed. In the next sectionpt
we describe the state variables and the structure of belief and in Theorem 2 below we confirm the above
conjecture. For an optimum there exists a constant vector  u so the demand functions for the stock is
(2)            .θit(pt) '
τ
R σˆ2Q
[ E it ( Qt%1) % uψ
i
t]
6 is an adjusted conditional variance (the “adjustment” is explained later) of excess stock returnσˆ2Q
which is assumed to be constant and the same for all agents. The term  is the intertemporal hedginguψit
demand which is linear in agent i’s state variables. We have stressed that disagreements among agents
arises from diverse interpretation of the commonly known empirical record. We made a realistic
assumption that the empirical frequencies of past payoffs follow a first order Markov process hence the
long term empirical process has the transition
(3)  .dt ' λd dt&1 % ρ
d
t , ρ
d
t - N(0 , σ
2
d )
Since the implied stationary probability is denoted by  m, we write .E m[dt%1 |dt] ' λd dt
Is the stationary model (3) the true data generating mechanism?  Those who believe the
economy is stationary would accept (3) as the truth. We view such belief as rational since there is no
empirical evidence against it. Since { } is a non-stationary with unknown probability  Π, thedt, t'1,2,...
empirical record (3) is just an average over different regimes. Hence, most agents do not believe past
empirical record is adequate to forecast the future. All surveys of forecasters show that subjective
judgment about the data contributes more than 50% to the final forecast (e.g. Batchelor and Dua
(1991)). Given this environment, each agent forms his own belief about dt+1 and other state variables
explored in the next section. With high level of complexity, how do we describe an equilibrium? For
such a description do we really need to give a full, detailed, development of the diverse theories of all
agents? The structure of belief is our next topic.
1.2 Modeling Heterogeneity of belief  I: Individual Belief as a State Variable
We start with a methodological comment. We have noted that an agent should not be declared
irrational if he does not know what he cannot know and consequently, the concept of rationality must
be modified. The theory of Rational Beliefs (in short, RB due to Kurz (1994), (1997a)) defines an agent
to be rational if his model cannot be falsified by the data and if simulated, it reproduces the empirical
distribution. In this paper we use only the most basic restrictions of this theory which are noted later,
and in Section 1.3.1 we review all rationality conditions this theory imposes on our model. For the
moment we note that under this theory, without a known “true” model any meaningful concept of belief
rationality must embrace a wide collection of models without resorting to psychological or behavior
principles to explain such diversity. This conclusion raises a clear methodological question. In
7formulating an asset pricing theory should we describe in detail the subjective models of each agent in
the model?  With diverse agents this task is formidable. Also, if the objective is to study dynamics of
asset prices, is such a detailed description necessary? An examination of the subject reveals that,
although an intriguing question, such a detailed task is not needed. Instead, to describe an equilibrium
all we need is to specify how the beliefs of agents affect their subjectively perceived transition functions
of all state variables. Once these are specified, the Euler equations are fully specified and market
clearing leads to equilibrium pricing. In the rest of this section we explain this methodology. 
We observe that in markets with heterogenous beliefs agents are willing to reveal their
forecasts. Hence, in formulating our theory we now assume that market forecast data are public. The
crucial difference between markets with and without private information is that when an individual’s
forecasts of a state variable are revealed in a market without private information, others do not see such
forecasts as a source of new data and do not update their own beliefs about any parameter to forecast
state variables. In such a market, a forecaster uses knowledge about the forecasts of state variables by
other forecasters only to alter his forecasts of endogenous variables since these depend upon the
market belief. In short, the difference between an equilibrium with asymmetric private information and
an equilibrium without private information but with heterogenous beliefs is that in the latter agents do
not learn from others and do not update their beliefs about state variables based on the opinions of
others (for details see Kurz (2006)). But then, how do we describe the individual and market beliefs?
The key analytical step taken (see Kurz (1994), Nielsen (1996), Kurz (1997a), Kurz and
Motolese (2001), Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a),(2005b)) is to treat individual beliefs as state
variables, generated by the agents within the economy. Here we adapt the ideas of Kurz, Jin and
Motolese (2005a), (2005b) to the problem studied in this paper and outline now this adaptation. 
An individual belief about an economy’s state variable is described with a personal state of
belief which uniquely pins down the transition function of the agent’s belief about next period’s
economy’s state variable. Note that this implies that personal state variables and the economy-wide
state variables are not necessarily the same. A personal state of belief is analogous to any other state
variables in the agent’s decision problem although it can also be interpreted as defining the more
familiar concept of a “type” of that agent. At date t he is not certain of his future belief type but his
behavior model (e.g. Bayesian updating) and interpretation of current information may determine the
dynamics of his personal state of belief. The distribution of individual states of belief is then an
8economy-wide state variable whose moments play an important role in the work below. As we
indicated, the crucial fact is that the distribution of beliefs in the market is observable. In equilibrium,
endogenous variables (e.g. prices) depend upon the economy’s state variables, but in a large economy
an agent’s “anonymity” implies that a personal state of belief has a negligible effect on prices. Thus, as
in any equilibrium, endogenous variables are functions of the economy’s state variables and here these
state variables include the distribution of personal beliefs. Hence, all moments of this distribution could
matter in equilibrium. Due to the exponential utility we use, equilibrium endogenous variables depend
only on the mean market states of belief. This will be generalized in the empirical work reported later.
Finally, since endogenous variables are functions of the market beliefs, endogenous variables are
forecasted by forecasting the market distribution of beliefs using the known equilibrium map. Hence, to
forecast future endogenous variables an agent must forecast the beliefs of others.
A simple principle of rationality implies that an individual state of belief cannot be a constant
unless an agent believes the stationary measure (3) is the truth and consequently the issue discussed in
this section is the dynamics of individual beliefs. To see this argument suppose agents hold diverse
beliefs which are different from (3). If an agent holds a constant belief but not (3) then over time his
average belief is different from (3). Since (3) is the time average in the data, this is an empirical proof
that his belief is irrational. Clearly, just being wrong is not the real issue. Rational agents hold wrong
beliefs most of the time when there is no empirical proof that they are wrong. To see why note that
when rational agents hold diverse probability models while there is only one true law of dynamic motion
then most are wrong most of the time. Hence the average market forecasting model is often wrong.
This is actually the essence of the market risk we call “Endogenous Uncertainty”.
 We now introduce agent i’s state of belief  . It describes his perception by pinning down hisg it
transition functions. Adding to “anonymity” we assume agent R  knows his own  and the marketg Rt
distribution of  across i. In addition he observes past distributions of the  for all τ < t hence heg it g
i
τ
knows past values of all moments of the distributions of . We specify the dynamics of  by   g i
τ
g it
(4) g it ' λZg
i
t&1 % ρ
ig
t , ρ
ig
t - N( 0 , σ
2
g )
where   are correlated across  i  reflecting correlation of beliefs across individuals. The concept of anρigt
individual state of belief, with dynamics (4), is central to our development and we consider (4) to be a
primitive. It is simply a positive description of type heterogeneity but in Section 1.3 we deduce (4) as a
consequence of a Bayesian updating procedure. To motivate our approach we note that   is used tog it
9express an agent’s assessment of the difference between date t forecast of an observable state variable
and the forecast under the empirical distribution  m. In our model agent i’s perception of date t
distribution of  (denoted by ) is described by using the belief state  as followsdt%1 d
i
t%1 g
i
t
(5a)  .d it%1 ' λd dt % λ
g
dg
i
t % ρ
id
t , ρ
id
t - N(0 , σˆ
2
d )
The assumption that  is the same for all agents is made for simplicity. It follows that the state ofσˆ2Q
belief   measures the deviation of his forecast from the empirical stationary forecastg it
(5b)  .E i [d it%1 |Ht ,g
i
t ] & E
m [dt%1 |Ht ]' λ
g
dg
i
t
Indeed, (5b) shows how to measure  in practice. For a state variable Xt,  data on i’s forecasts of Xt g
i
t
(in (5b) it is dt ) are measured by . One then uses standard econometric techniques toE
i [X it |Ht , g
i
t ]
construct the stationary forecast with which one constructs the difference in (5b). ThisE m [Xt |Ht ]
construction and the data it generates are the basis of the work of Fan (2006). An agent type who
believes the empirical distribution is the truth, is described by . He believes .g it ' 0 dt%1-N(λd dt ,σ
2
d)
Since belief heterogeneity results from economic dynamic non-stationarity, it should be clear that in
1900 subjective assessments  were related to the development of electricity and the combustiong it
engine, while in 2000  measured the impact of computers and information technology. Hence,g it
success or failures of past   do not tell you anything about what present day  should be. We nowg i
τ
g it
deduce (4) from Bayesian principles.
1.3 Deducing (4)  from Bayesian Updating Procedureg it%1 ' λZg
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1
We aim to maintain simplicity and analytic tractability and note at the outset that in a rapidly
changing environment there is no universal procedures to learn an unknown sequence of parameters. It
is then less important to explain why agents disagree and more important to describe their diversity so
that equilibrium analysis is tractable. The description (4)  of the dynamics of beliefg it%1 ' λZg
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1
states leads to a simple and useful description of equilibrium pricing with diverse beliefs as shown in this
paper. It does not entail extraction of information from market prices, it requires each agent to have a
distinct state space to describe his uncertainty and dictates the endogenous expansion of the economy
wide state space for equilibrium pricing. However, we now explore the conditions under which the
Markov dynamics (4) is a consequence of elementary principles of Bayesian inference. 
 In a standard environment of Bayesian learning an agent faces data generated under an
unknown fixed parameter. The agent starts with a prior on the parameter and then uses Bayesian
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inference for retrospective updating of his belief. The term “retrospective” stresses that inference is
made after data is observed. In real time one must use the prior to forecast the variable and learning can
only improve future forecasts of that variable. Our model has some parameters fixed and others that
change over time. The fixed parameters are known since they are deduced from the empirical
frequencies. The time varying parameters, reflecting the non stationarity of the economy, are modeled
by the fact that under the true probability Π the value  has a transition function of the formdt
(6) .  dt%1 & λddt ' bt % ρ
d
t
The sequence of parameters  is an exogenous, time varying mean value function. Agents know  butbt λd
not the sequence bt. This formulation includes economies with slow changing regimes, each lasting a
long time. Regimes may change rapidly or slowly but the mere fact that they change limits the validity
of Bayesian updating. To understand this fact observe that at date  t our agent has a prior belief about bt
with which he forecasts . After observing  he updates his prior to have a sharper posteriordt%1 dt%1
estimate of  bt. But when date t+1 arrives he needs to forecast and for that he needs a prior on bt+1.dt%2
Agents do not know if and when a parameter changes. If the  bt  change slowly, a sharp posterior
estimate of  bt (given ) may serve also as a prior belief about  bt+1. Indeed, if the agent knew thatdt%1
 the updated posterior of  bt is the best prior of  bt+1. In the absence of such knowledge, agentsbt ' bt%1
would believe that  is one possibility. They would, however, seek any additional informationbt ' bt%1
and use other subjective interpretation of public data to arrive at alternative subjective estimates of
to supplement the Bayesian procedure. Such subjective interpretation of public data arises naturallybt%1
from the fact that public quantitative data is always provided together with a vast amount of qualitative
information which is the basis of all subjective interpretation of data. 
1.3.1 Qualitative Information and Subjective Interpretation of Public Information
Bayesian inference is only possible with quantitative measures. The fact is that quantitative data
like  are always accompanied with much qualitative public information about usual or unusualdt
conditions. For example, data on inflation are interpreted with reports on normal or abnormal
productivity features, conditions of the labor markets, assessment of the price of energy, political
environment, etc. If   are profits of a firm then  is just one number extracted from a detaileddt dt
financial report of the firm and multitude of reports about the industry, the technology or the products
involved. If  are profits of the S&P500 then qualitative information includes general businessdt
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conditions, monetary policy, political environment, prospective tax reform, trends in productivity and
other macroeconomic conditions. Generally, qualitative information cannot be compared over time and
does not constitute conventional “data.” For example, when a firm announces a new research into
something that did not exist before, no past data is available for comparison. When a new product alters
the nature of an industry, it is a unique event.  Financial markets pay a great deal of attention to
qualitative announcements which are often the focus of diverse opinions of investors.
There is little formal modeling of deduction from qualitative information. Saari (2006) uses
qualitative information in the context of a dynamical model of market shares. The model traces out the
equilibrium dynamics of each firm’s market share where qualitative information is represented by the
derivative of a firm’s response function at specified points. Such derivatives at isolated points in the
space provide a rational player an indication of possible future dynamical evolutions which are
consistent with the given derivatives. For an additional application see Toukan (2006). 
Here we adopt a very simple formalization of the use of  qualitative information. Thus, we
consider all qualitative information as statements about the future. A statement may turn out to be true
of false. Denote date t statements by . The list changes over time hence  varies with(Ct1,Ct2,...,CtKt) Kt
t. These may offer contradictory perspectives in the sense that if, say, Ct1 materializes it would imply
bright prospects for while  Ct2  may lead to a negative assessment of . A realization at t+1 is adt%1 dt%1
vector  of numbers which are  0 or 1: 0 means the statement turns outnt%1 ' (nt%1,1 , nt%1,2 , . . . ,nt%1,Kt )
to be false and 1 means it is true. There are   possible outcomes, denoted . 2
Kt
nt%1(k) , k'1, 2,..., 2
Kt
We now introduce a subjective map from to valuation . Each is a quantitative evaluationnt%1 Φ
i(nt%1)
by agent i of the effect of each possible outcome on . This is an independent estimate by(dt%1&λd dt)
agent i on how different is from the stationary forecast. Finally, agent i  attaches probabilitiesdt%1
 to each of the qualitative outcomes. This procedure results in agent i making an(a i1 , a
i
2 , . . . ,a
i
2
Kt
)
alternate subjective estimate of     based only on the qualitative data at his disposal:(dt%1 & λd dt )
(7)           .Ψit '
j
2
Kt
k ' 1
a ik Φ
i(nit%1(k ))
Since by (3) the long term average of   is zero, rationality requires the  are zero mean(dt%1 & λd dt ) Ψ
i
t
random variables. Although public data consist only of  , the procedure outlined shows that in adt
world with diverse beliefs agents endogenously create subjective quantitative measures which reflect
their beliefs. We incorporate such a measure in the Bayesian procedure below.
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1.3.2 A Bayesian Model: Beliefs are Markov State Variable
As assumed earlier, under the true probability Π, the value  has a true transition of a formdt%1
(6a) .dt%1 & λddt ' bt % ρ
d
t%1 , ρ
d
t%1 - N(0 ,
1
β
)
bt is a time varying mean value. Agents do not know bt and at first decision date t (say, t = 1) they have
two pieces of information. They know  and observe qualitative information  withdt (C(t)1,C(t)2,...,C(t)Kt)
which they assess . Without  the prior mean of the agent at t = 1 is  b  but to start the process heΨit Ψ
i
t
uses both sources to form a prior belief  about  bt (used to forecast ). However, theE
i
t (bt |dt ,Ψ
i
t ) dt%1
changing parameter  bt  leads to a problem. When  is observed agent i updates his belief todt%1&λddt
. But agent i needs an estimate of , not of . Hence, how does he go from E
i
t (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) bt%1 bt
 to a new prior  of ?  Without any new information his prior belief of   will remainE it (bt |dt ,Ψ
i
t ) bt%1 bt%1
the same and he simply takes  as the new prior belief of . This is particularly true ifE it (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) bt%1
the b’s change very slowly. Indeed, since Bayesian learning draws its inference from the past, it cannot
offer a method of updating one’s belief about a future value of a changing sequence of parameters. To
that end the agent  uses the public qualitative information  released at the(C(t%1)1 , C(t%1)2 , . . . , C(t%1)Kt%1)
start of date t+1 but before trading. These lead to subjective measures  which are, in fact, alternateΨit%1
estimates of . Now our agent has two independent sources for belief about : bt%1 bt%1 E
i
t (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t )
and  which must be reconciled. Under a Bayesian approach we thus assume:Ψit%1
Assumption (*): Agent i uses a subjective probability  to form date t+1 prior belief which is thenµ
(8a) .E it%1 ( bt%1 | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t%1) ' µE
i
t (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) % (1&µ)Ψ
i
t%1 0 < µ < 1
For consistency, if  is believed to be Normal then at the initial date t=1 the prior must beΨi1
(8b) .b1-N(µb% (1&µ)Ψ
i
1 ,
1
α
)
This assumption is the new element that permits  to be upgraded into a prior belief atE it%1 ( bt | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t )
date t+1, ,  before  is observed. We can now show the following:E it (bt%1 |dt%1 , Ψ
i
t%1) dt%2
Theorem 1: Suppose , i.i.d. and Assumption (*) holds. Then for large values of  t,  theΨit - N(0 ,
1
γ
)
posterior   is a Markov state variable such that if we define  andE it%1 ( bt%1 | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) g
i
t ' E
i
t (bt |dt ,Ψ
i
t )
 then the dynamics (4) holds:  (8a) implies (4).µ ' λZ
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Proof: Pick a starting date t = 1 when data  is known and the agent generates a subjective measure ofdt
qualitative data .  He then forms a prior on , assumed to be  . Now we
Ψ
i
t bt bt-N(µb% (1&µ)Ψ
i
t ,
1
α
)
move on to t+1 and dt+1 is observed. The agent updates the prior in a standard Bayesian manner:
(9) .E it%1 ( bt | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) '
α (µb% (1&µ)Ψit ) % β[ dt%1&λddt]
α % β
, 0 #µ # 1
But before date t+1 trading he generates the subjective measure  of qualitative data. By theΨit%1
Assumption (8a) the expected parameter bt+1 under the new prior at t+1 is 
.E it (bt%1 |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) ' µ E
i
t ( bt | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) % ( 1&µ )Ψ
i
t%1 , 0 #µ # 1
Denote by  . Then the prior is  ζ ' 1
µ2
and ξ ' 1
( 1&µ )2
.bt%1 - N( E
i
t (bt%1 |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) ,
1
ζ (α%β ) % ξγ
)
It is used to  forecast . Moving on to t+2, the agent observes and based on thisdt%2&λd dt%1 dt%2&λd dt%1
observation he updates his belief to
 .E it%1(bt%1 |dt%2 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) '
(ζ (α%β )%ξγ ) [ µ E it (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t )% (1&µ )Ψ
i
t%1 ] % β[ dt%2&λddt%1]
ζ (α%β )% (ξγ % β )
Before the start of date t+2 trading the agent generates a new value  leading to t+2 belief thatΨit%2
.E it%2 ( bt%2 | dt%2 ,Ψ
i
t%2 ) ' µ E
i
t%1 ( bt%1 | dt%2 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) % ( 1&µ )Ψ
i
t%2 , 0 #µ < 1
When is observed the updated belief is thendt%3&λddt%2
 .E it%2 (bt%2 |dt%3 , Ψ
i
t%2) '
[ζ2(α%β)%(ξγ%β)
j
1
n'0
ζ
n
&β][µE it%1(bt%1 |dt%2 ,Ψ
i
t%1)%(1&µ)Ψ
i
t%2]%β[dt%3&λddt%2]
ζ
2(α%β)% (ξγ%β )
j
1
n'0
ζ
n
Next the agent generates a new value  leading to t+3 belief  . By induction weΨit%3 E
i
t%3 ( bt%3 | dt%3 ,Ψ
i
t%3 )
iterate forward to conclude that
E it%N (bt%N |dt%N%1 ,Ψ
i
t%N ) '
[ζN&1(α%β)% (ξγ%β)
j
N&1
n'0
ζ
n
&β]
ζ
N(α % β)% (ξγ%β )
j
N&1
n'0
ζ
n
[µE it (bt%N&1 |dt%N ,Ψ
i
t%N&1)% (1&µ)Ψ
i
t%N] %
 + .
β [ dt%N%1&λddt%N]
ζ
N(α%β) % (ξγ%β )
j
N&1
n'0
ζ
n
Now take the limit. Since , as N increases  hence we find that for large t 
ζ > 1 ζN 6 4
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 E it%1(bt%1 |dt%2 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) ' µ E
i
t (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) % (1&µ )Ψ
i
t%1
But by definition we have 
(10) E it%1 ( bt%1 | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) ' µ E
i
t (bt |dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) % (1&µ )Ψ
i
t%1
We conclude that for large t, the contribution of each new observation of dividends is negligible hence
 .E it ( bt | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t ) ' E
i
t ( bt | dt ,Ψ
i
t )
Inserting this last equation in (10) we finally have the desired conclusion for large t
(11) .E it%1 ( bt%1 | dt%1 ,Ψ
i
t%1 ) ' µ E
i
t (bt |dt ,Ψ
i
t ) % (1&µ )Ψ
i
t%1
Now identify ,   and    to see that (11) is actually  (4).  g it ' E
i
t (bt |dt ,Ψ
i
t ) (1&µ)Ψ
i
t%1 ' ρ
ig
t%1 µ ' λZ
Theorem 1 shows that as the dt  data set increases, there is nothing new to learn. The posterior does not
converge but the law of motion of the posterior converges to a time invariant stochastic law of motion
defined by (11). The posterior fluctuates forever, providing the foundations for the dynamics of market
belief but the fluctuations follow a simple Markov transition. New data dt and  alter the conditionalΨ
i
t
probability of the agent, but these do not change the dynamic law of motion of  . g it
1.4 Modeling Heterogeneity of belief II: Market Belief and Rationality 
1.4.1 Individual and Market Beliefs
Denote by  the first moment of the cross sectional distribution of the  and we refer to it asZt g
i
t
“the average state of belief.” It is observable.  Due to correlation across agents, the law of large
numbers is not operative and the average of   over i does not vanish. We write it in the form  ρigt
(12) .Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρ
Z
t%1
The true distribution of   is unknown. Correlation across agents exhibits non stationarity and thisρZt%1
property is inherited by the { Zt , t = 1, 2, ...} process. Since Zt are observable, market participants
actually have data on the joint process  { }.  Agents are thus assumed to know the(dt , Zt%1 ) , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
joint empirical distribution of these variables. For simplicity we assume that this distribution is
described by the system of equations
    
(13a) dt%1 ' λd dt % ρ
d
t%1
(13b) Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρ
Z
t%1
ρ
d
t%1
ρ
Z
t%1
- N
0
0
,
σ
2
d, 0,
0, σ2Z
' Σ˜ , i.i.d.
Now, an agent who does not believe that (13a)-(13b) is the truth, formulates his own model\belief. We
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have seen in (5a) how agent  i’s belief state  pins down his forecast of  . We now broaden thisg it d
i
t%1
idea to an agent’s perception model of the two state variables . Keeping in mind that before(d it%1 , Z
i
t%1 )
observing  agent i knows , his belief takes the general form  dt%1 dt and Zt
(14a) d it%1 ' λd dt % λ
g
d g
i
t % ρ
id
t%1
(14b)  Z it%1 ' λZ Zt % λ
g
Zg
i
t % ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
id
t%1
ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
ig
t%1
- N
0
0
0
,
σˆ
2
d , σˆZd , 0
σˆZd , σˆ
2
Z , 0
0 , 0 , σˆ2g
, ' Σi
   
(14c) g it%1 ' λZ g
i
t % ρ
ig
t%1
Although the state variable  defines belief about future value of , (14a)-(14b) show that we use itg it dt%1
also to pin down the transition of . This simplicity ensures that one state variable pins down agent i’sZ it%1
subjective belief. Hence,   expresses how the agent considers the present conditions to be differentg it
from the empirical distribution:
   E it
dt%1
Zt%1
& E mt
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
d g
i
t
λ
g
Z g
i
t
.
The average market expectation operator is defined by .  From (14c) it isE¯t (C ) '
m
E it ( C ) di
 (14d)   .    E¯t
dt%1
Zt%1
& E mt
dt%1
Zt%1
'
λ
g
d Zt
λ
g
Z Zt
Higher Order Beliefs. One must distinguish between higher order belief which are temporal and those
which are contemporaneous. Within our theory the system (14a)-(14c) defines agent i’s probability over 
sequences of and as is the case for any probability measure, it implies temporal higher order(dt , Zt , g
i
t )
beliefs of agent i with regard to future events. For example, we deduce from (14a)-(14c) statement like
.E it (dt%N)'EtE
i
t%1 . . .E
i
t%N&1(dt%N) , E
i
t (Z
i
t%N)'Et E
i
t%1 . . .E
i
t%N&1( Z
i
t%N)
It is thus clear that temporal higher order beliefs are simple properties of conditional expectations. In
addition, since (12) is implied by (14c) we have  . Hence we can alsoE¯t (dt%N%1)'λdE¯t(dt%N)%λ
g
dE¯t (Zt%N)
deduce perceived higher order market beliefs by averaging individual beliefs. For example, we have that
.E¯t (Zt%N) ' E¯t E¯t%N&1 (dt%N) & E¯tE
m
t%N&1 (dt%N)
The perception models (14a)-(14c) show that properties of conditional probabilities do not apply
to the market belief operator  since it is not a proper conditional expectation. To see why letE¯t(C )
 be a space where take values and Gi  be the space of . Since  i  conditions on , hisX'D×Z (dt , Zt) g
i
t g
i
t
unconditional probability is a measure on the space where öi is a sigma field. The(( D×Z×G i)4 ,öi)
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market conditional belief operator is an average over conditional probabilities, each conditioned on a
different state variable. Hence, this averaging does not permit one to write a probability space for the
market belief. The market belief is neither a probability nor rational and we have the following result:
Theorem 2: The market belief operator violates iterated expectations: .E¯t (dt%2 ) … E¯t E¯t%1( dt%2 )
Proof:  Since
 E it (dt%2 ) ' λdE
i
t ( dt%1 ) % λ
g
d E
i
t (g
i
t%1) ' λd [λd dt%λ
g
d g
i
t ] % λ
g
dλZg
i
t
It follows that 
(15a) .E¯t (dt%2 ) ' λ
2
d dt%λ
g
d (λd % λZ) Zt
On the other hand we have from (14a) that 
E¯t%1 ( dt%2 ) ' λd dt%1 % λ
g
d Zt%1
hence 
.E it E¯t%1 ( dt%2 ) ' λd [λd dt % λ
g
d g
i
t ] % λ
g
d [λZ Zt % λ
g
Zg
i
t ]
Aggregating now we conclude that
(15b) .E¯t E¯t%1 (dt%2) ' λ
2
d dt % λ
g
d (λd % λZ % λ
g
Z ) Zt
Comparison of (15a) and (15b) shows that .  E¯t (dt%2 ) … E¯tE¯t%1 ( dt%2 )
Contemporaneous higher order beliefs occur naturally in games but not in markets, despite the
common and false interpretation of the Keynesian Beauty Contest. To explain the issue observe that,
formally speaking, we could incorporate such higher order beliefs in our theory by incorporating belief
variables about future distributions of market belief variables. For example, in (14a)-(14b) we could have
introduced a second and separate variable to express belief about future values of the market belief g i2t
Z (which would become ). This triggers an infinite regress since the average of  is an aggregateZ 1 g i2t
market belief   hence we need to introduce , a belief about , and hence proceed to all higherZ 2t g
i3
t Z
2
t
order beliefs. We did not introduce such a structure for two reasons. First, simplicity is a virtue and
infinite number of transitions are not tractable. A much deeper reason is that all higher order market
beliefs   are degenerate. This is so since they are averages of   and since for j >1 theZ jt , for j>1 g
ij
t
are not observable, there is no mechanism for the individual to be correlated as in (12). WithZ j g ijt
independent  the averages, defined to be , are zero and hence degenerate variables. g ijt Z
j
t for j>1
17
Belief and Information: Understanding what is. From the perspective of an agent,  is a stateZt Zt
variable like any other. News about  are used to forecast prices and assess market risk premia in theZt
same way macroeconomic data such as GNP growth or Non Farm Payroll are used to assess the risk of
a recession. Market belief may be wrong as it forecasts more recessions that occur. Market risk premia
may fall just because agents are more optimistic about the future, not necessarily because there is any
specific data which convinces everybody the future is bright. But then, how do agents update their
beliefs when they observe ? In sharp contrast with a theory assuming the presence of privateZt
information, agents do not revise their own beliefs about the state variable : (14a) specifically doesdt%1
not depend upon . Agents do not consider  as information about  because it is not a “signal”Zt Zt dt%1
about unobserved private information they do not have. This is the case since they know all use the same
available information.  However, they do consider  to be “news” about what the market thinks aboutZt
 Hence, the importance of   is it’s great value in forecasting future endogenous variables. Date tdt%1! Zt
endogenous variables depend upon  and  future endogenous variables depend upon future Z’s. SinceZt
market belief exhibits persistence, agents know that today’s market belief is useful for forecasting future
endogenous variables. How is this equilibrated?  This is what we show now.
1.4.1 Rationality: The Theory of Rational Beliefs
We have seen that the market belief is not necessarily rational hence averaging (14a) -(14c) is not
required to imply a consistent probability measure. What about individuals? Since they do not know the
true probability Π, we assume (14a) -(14c) my not be the truth. But then, can we rationalize such a belief
on its own? That is, what restrictions do (14a) -(14c) need to satisfy in order for them to represent the
belief of a rational individual agent? What criteria are used in formulating such restrictions? Note that we
have already imposed some rationality conditions. First, we argued that rational agents will exhibit
fluctuating beliefs since a constant belief which is not in accord with the empirical distribution is
irrational. Second, we required  to have an unconditional zero mean by requiring individual beliefs tog it
be about deviations from the empirical frequencies. This, by itself, places restrictions on beliefs. We
now explain the additional restrictions imposed by the theory of Rational Beliefs.  
The theory of Rational Belief (in short, RB) due to Kurz (1994), (1997a) proposes natural
restrictions on beliefs with the view to explain the emergence of diverse beliefs and excess volatility. In a
sequence of papers since 1994 the theory has been applied to various markets (e.g. Kurz  (1997a),
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(1997b), Kurz and Schneider (1996), Kurz and Wu (1996), Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005b), Motolese
(2001), (2003) Nielsen (1996), (2003), Wu and Guo (2003), (2004)). In relation to the equity risk
premium, Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001), and Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a)
explain the equity premium by asymmetry in the distribution of beliefs. 
A belief is an RB if it is a probability model which, if simulated, reproduces the empirical
distribution known from the data. An RB is thus a model which cannot be rejected by the empirical
evidence represented by m. In our model beliefs are specified by perception models (14a) -(14c) in which
the dynamics of  expresses the subjective belief of an agent.  For (14a) -(14c) to be RB it needs tog it
induce the same empirical distribution as (13a)-(13b). But this amounts to the requirement that
(16)   The empirical distribution of  = the distribution of  
λ
g
dg
i
t %ρ
id
t
λ
g
Zg
i
t %ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
d
t
ρ
Z
t%1
-N
0
0
,
σ
2
d, 0,
0, σ2Z
, i.i.d.
To compute the implied data generated by the model, one treats the   symmetrically with otherg it
random variables. From (14c), the unconditional variance of   is   Hence, weg it Var(g
i)'σ2g / ( 1&λ
2
Z )
have the following rationality conditions which follow from (16):
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  
(λgd )
2
σ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆ
2
d ' σ
2
d
(λgZ )
2
σ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆ
2
Z ' σ
2
Z
λ
g
dλ
g
Zσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆZd ' 0
    (iv)    (v) .    
(λgd )
2
λZσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% Cov(ρˆidt , ρˆ
id
t&1 ) ' 0
(λgZ )
2
λZσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% Cov(ρˆiZt , ρˆ
iZ
t&1 ) ' 0
The first three conditions pin down the covariance matrix in (14a)-(14c). The last two pin down the
serial correlation of the two terms . An inspection of (14a)-(14c) reveals the only choice left( ρˆidt , ρˆ
iZ
t )
for a agent are the two free parameters . But under the RB theory these are not free either since(λgd , λ
g
Z )
there natural conditions they must satisfy. First,  place two strict conditions on :σˆ2d > 0 , σˆ
2
Z > 0 (λ
g
d , λ
g
Z )
   , .|λgd | <
σd
σg
1 & λ2Z |λ
g
Z | <
σZ
σg
1 & λ2Z
Finally, to ensure the covariance matrix in (14a)-(14c) is positive definite one must impose an additional
condition. The condition
    
1 & λ2Z
σ
2
g
>
(λgZ)
2
σ
2
Z
%
(λgd)
2
σ
2
d
is sufficient. Hence the "free" parameters  are restricted to a rather narrow range. Since these are(λgd , λ
g
Z )
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the restrictions on the parameters of (14a)-(14c) they are empirically testable.
1.5 Combining the Elements: the Implied Asset Pricing Under Diverse Beliefs
We now derive equilibrium prices and the risk premium. Details about the value function and the
demand functions are provided in an Appendix where we explain the term “adjusted” conditional
variance of , denoted below by .  We first specify the state variables of agent i’s demand functionQt%1 σˆ
2
Q
(2) by  and write this function asψit ' (1 , dt ,Zt ,g
i
t )
(17) .θit(pt) '
τ
R σˆ2Q
[ E it ( Qt%1) % uψ
i
t] , u' ( u0 , u1 , u2 , u3 ) , ψ
i
t ' ( 1, dt , Zt ,g
i
t )
For an equilibrium to exist we need some stability conditions. First we require the interest rate r to be
positive,  R = 1 + r > 1 so that   . Now we add:0 < 1
R
< 1
Stability Conditions: We require that     . 0 < λd < 1 , 0 < λZ % λ
g
Z < 1
The first requires {dt , t = 1, 2, ...}  to be stable and have an empirical distribution. The second is a
stability of belief condition. It requires i to believe  is stable. To see why take expectations of(dt , Zt)
(14b), average over the population and recall that  Zt  are market averages of the . This implies that g
i
t
.E¯t [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ % λ
g
Z )Zt
Theorem 3: Consider the model with heterogenous beliefs under the stability conditions specified with
supply of shares equals 1. Then there is a unique equilibrium price function which takes the form  
.pt ' ad dt % az Zt % P0
Proof:  Average (17)  to have
(18)   .
R σˆ2Q
τ
' [ E¯t(pt%1%dt%1%µ ) & Rpt % (u0%u1dt% (u2%u3)Zt) ]
Now use the perception models (14a)-(14b) about the state variables, average them over the population
and use the definition of  Zt  to deduce the following relationships which are the key implications of
treating individual and market beliefs as state variables
(18a) E¯t(dt%1 % µ ) ' λddt % µ % λ
g
d Zt
(18b) E¯t [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ%λ
g
Z)Zt
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Using these to solve for date t price we deduce
(19) pt '
1
R
[ E¯t(pt%1 )] %
1
R
[ (λd % u1)dt % (λ
g
d % u2 % u3)Zt] %
1
R
[ µ % u0] &
σˆ
2
Q
τ
(19) shows that equilibrium price is the solution of a linear difference equation  in the two state variables 
. Hence,  a standard argument (see Blanchard and Kahn(1980), Proposition, page 1308) shows(dt , Zt)
that the solution is 
 (20a) pt ' ad dt % az Zt % P0
To match coefficients use (20a) to insert (18a) - (18b) into (19) and conclude that
 (20b)  . ad '
λd % u1
R & λd
 (20c)  az '
( ad % 1)λ
g
d % ( u2 % u3 )
R& (λZ%λ
g
Z )
 (20d) .P0 '
(µ % u0)
r
&
σˆ
2
Q R
τ r
The stability conditions ensure that  (20a) -  (20d) is the unique solution as asserted.  
Since we do not have a closed form solution for the hedging demand parameters  weu' (u0 ,u1 ,u2 ,u3 )
computed numerical Monte Carlo solutions. For all feasible values of the model parameters we find that
 hence  ad > 0 and  hence az > 0. These are entirely reasonableu1'0 (ad % 1)λ
g
d % (u2 % u3 ) > 0
conclusions: today’s price of the asset increases if  rises and today’s price of the asset is higher whendt
- the present day market belief in higher future dividend rate - increases.Zt dt%1
 1.6 Equilibrium Risk Premium
1.6.1 The Main Equilibrium Results
We now explore the often misunderstood problem of measuring market risk premium under
heterogenous beliefs. We shall see in a moment that there are many different concepts involved here and
the main issue is one of choosing the concept which is most appropriate to any application. The
definition of the realized risk premium on a long position, as a random variable, is clearly defined by
(21)         .πt%1 '
pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt
pt
(21) is a random variable measuring the actual excess return of stocks over the riskless bond. The need
is to measure the premium as a known expected quantity which is recognized by market participants. We
have three such measures. The first is the subjective expected excess returns by agent i which is
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computed from (18) to be
(22a) .
1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[R
σˆ
2
Q
τ
& ( u0%u1dt % u2 Zt%u3 g
i
t ) ]
Alternatively, we use the equilibrium map (20a) and the perception model (14a)-(14c) to show that
(22b)
1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(ad%1)(λd dt%λ
g
dg
i
t )%az(λZZt%λ
g
Zg
i
t )%µ%P0&Rpt]
Diverse beliefs implies the perceived premia vary across agents and this diversity is the crucial cause of
trade and volatility. Aggregating over i we define the market premium as the average market expected
excess returns. This perceived market premium reflects what the market expects, not necessarily what
the market gets. From (22a)-(22b) we deduce that it is measured by
(23)
1
pt
E¯t(pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt ) '
1
pt
[R
σˆ
2
Q
τ
& u0 & u1dt & (u2%u3)Zt) ]
 .'
1
pt
[(ad%1)(λddt%λ
g
d Zt) % az(λZZt % λ
g
ZZt)%µ %P0&Rpt]
Neither the individual perceived premium nor the market perceived premium are necessarily
correct. Hence we focus on the third premium which is an objective measure, common to all agents.
Agents who study the long term time variability of the premium would measure it by the empirical
distribution of (21). Using the equilibrium map (18) and the stationary transition (13a)-(13b) we have
(24) E mt [πt%1] '
1
pt
E mt [ pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt]
         .' 1
pt
[( ad%1) (λd dt)%az (λZ )Zt)%µ %P0&Rpt]
We stress that (24) is the way researchers cited above have measured the risk premium and therefore we
refer to it as “the” risk premium. 
We thus arrive at two important conclusions. First, the differences between the individual
perceived premium and the market perceived premium is
(25a) .
1
pt
E it (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) &
1
pt
E¯t( pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d% azλ
g
Z] ( g
i
t & Zt )
It is thus clear that from the perspective of trading, all that matters is the difference  of individualg it & Zt
from market belief. In addition, the following difference is important
(25b) .1
pt
E mt (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) &
1
pt
E¯t( pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) ' &
1
pt
[(ad%1)λ
g
d% azλ
g
Z] Zt
The risk premium is thus different from the market perceived premium when  Z …0. But the second, and
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more important, conclusion is derived by combining (23) with (25b). Keeping in mind that from (20c)
, we arrive at an analytical expression of the risk premium:&(u2 % u3) ' &az (R & λZ) % [(ad%1)λ
g
d % azλ
g
Z]
(26a)
1
pt
E mt (pt%1%dt%1%µ&Rpt) '
1
pt
[(R
σˆ
2
Q
τ
& u0 & u1dt) & az (R & λZ) Zt]
Since az > 0,   R > 1 and  it follows that the premium per share declines with . We conclude λZ < 1 Zt
(26b) The Risk Premium   is decreasing in the mean market belief   .E mt [πt%1] Zt
Conclusions (26a) -(26b) are, perhaps, the most important results of this paper.  (26a) and the earlier
results exhibit the Endogenous Uncertainty component of the risk premium (see Kurz (1997a)) which
we call “The Market Belief Risk Premium.” It shows that market risk premia inherently depend upon
market belief. The effect of belief consist of two parts
(I) The first is the direct effect of market beliefs on the permanent mean premium . It isR
σˆ
2
Q
τ
shown in the Appendix that the adjusted variance follows from the existence of weights
 such that (ω1 ,ω12,ω2 )
      .
σˆ
2
Q ' Var
i
t ((ω1(λddt % λ
g
d g
i
t %ω12ρ
id
t%1)%ω2 (λZ Zt%λ
g
Zg
i
t %ω12ρ
iZ
t%1 ))
Hence, the direct effect of belief is in . Changed volatility of the market belief changes theρiZt%1
volatility of excess return with a direct impact on the risk premium.
(II)  The second is the effect of market belief on the time variability of the risk premium,
reflected in    with a negative sign when Zt > 0 which is very revealing. & az (R & λZ) Zt
To explain this second result we note that it says that if one runs a regression of excess returns on the
observable variables, the effect of the market belief on excess return is negative. This sign is surprising
since when Zt > 0 the market expects above normal future dividend and in that case the risk premium on
the stock declines. When the market holds bearish belief about future dividend ( Zt < 0) the risk premium
rises. The importance of this result is not only related to its theoretical implications but also because it is
empirically testable since we have data on Zt and we shall test this result empirically. However, before
we proceed to discuss the empirical test it would be useful to discuss some ramifications of this result. 
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1.6.2 The Market Belief Risk Premium is Fully General
The main result (26b), says the market belief   has a negative effect on the risk premium. ItZt
was derived from the assumed exponential utility function. We now argue that this result is far more
general and depends only on the positive coefficient  az  of  in the price map.  To show this, supposeZt
we assume any additive utility function over consumption and a risky asset which pays a “dividend” or
any other random payoff denoted by . Denote the price map by . We are interested indt pt ' Φ( dt , Zt )
the slope of the excess return function  with respect to . Focusing on the numerator onlyE mt [πt%1] Zt
 we linearize the price map around  0 and write . E mt [ pt%1 % dt%1 % µ & Rpt] pt ' Φddt % ΦZZt %Φ0
We now show that the desired result depends only upon the condition . This condition is entirely
ΦZ > 0
reasonable as it requires the current price to increases if the market is more optimistic about the asset’s
future payoffs. To prove the point note that 
 E mt [ pt%1% (dt%1%µ)&Rpt] . E
m
t [Φddt%1%ΦZZt%1%Φ0% (dt%1%µ)&R(Φddt%ΦZZt%Φ0 )]
      .
' [(Φd%1)λd & RΦd]dt&ΦZ(R & λZ)Zt% [µ%Φ0 ( 1&R)]
The desired result follows from the fact that ,  R> 1 and . ΦZ > 0 λZ < 1
The price map might be more complicated. If we write it as  where X arept ' Φ( dt , Zt , Xt )
other state variables (in particular, the distribution of wealth), the analysis is more complicated since we
need to specify a complete model for forecasting  but the main result continues to hold.Xt%1
1.6.3 Interpretation of the Market Belief Risk Premium
Why is the effect of  Zt on the risk premium negative? Since this result is general and applicable
to any asset with risky payoffs, we offer a general interpretation. Our result shows that when the market
holds abnormally favorable belief about future payoffs of an asset the market views the long position as
less risky and consequently the risk premium on the long position of the asset falls. Fluctuating market
belief implies time variability of risk premia but more specifically, fluctuations in risk premia are inversely
related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of asset payoffs.
To further explore the main result, it is important to explain what it does not say. One may
interpret our result as confirming a common claim that in order to maximize excess returns it is an
optimal strategy to be a “contrarian” to the market consensus by betting against it. To understand why
this is a false interpretation of our result note that when an agent holds a belief about future payments,
the market belief does not offer any new information to alter the individual’s belief about the exogenous
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variable. If the agent believes that future dividends will be abnormally high but , the agent does notZt < 0
change his forecast of . He uses the market belief information only to forecast future prices of andt%1
asset. Hence, Zt is a crucial input to forecasting returns without changing the forecast of . Sincedt%1
given the available information an optimizing agent is already on his demand function, he does not just
abandon his demand and becomes a contrarian. Our argument is the same as the one showing why it is
not optimal to adopt the log utility as your own utility even though it maximizes the growth rate of your
wealth. Yes it does that but you dislike the sharp declines which are expected in the value of your assets.
By analogy, following a “contrarian” policy may imply a high long run average return in accord with the
empirical probability m. However, if you disagree with this probability you will dislike being short when
your optimal position should be long. Indeed, this argument explains the fact that most people hold
positions which are in agreement with the market belief most of the time instead of betting against it as a
“contrarian” strategy would dictate. Taking a positive perspective, our result shows that if your belief
leads to an optimal long position in an asset, the market value of  will enable you to make a moreZt
precise estimate of your excess returns. Even if and you disagree with the market, you may stillZt < 0
maintain your long position but alter your estimated risk premium. The crucial observation we make is
that a maximizing agent has his own belief about future events, and he does not select a new belief when
he learns the market belief. From his point of view the market belief is an important state variable used
to forecast future prices just like other state variables such as Non Farm Payroll which also changes the
risk premium on investments in the bond and stock markets. We turn to an empirical test of our theory. 
2. Testing of the Endogenous Time Variability of the Risk Premium: The Data
2.1 The Forecast Data
Our basic data is on the distribution of commercial forecasts and we take it as a proxy for
forecasts made by the general public. The data is circulated monthly by the Blue Chip Financial
Forecasts (BLUF). It provides forecasts of over 50 economists at major corporations, financial
institutions, and consulting firms. The number of forecasters may vary from month to month and, due to
mergers and other organizational changes, the list of potential forecasters also changes over time. A
sample of forecasters includes Moody's Investors Service, Prudential Securities, Inc. Ford Motor
Company, Macroeconomic Advisers LLC, Goldman Sachs & Co., DuPont, Deutsche Bank Securities, J.
P. Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, and others.  BLUF reports forecasts of  U.S. interest rates
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at all maturities along with forecasts of GDP growth and inflation. Forecasts reported in BLUF are
collected on the 24th and 25th of each month and released to subscribers on the first day of the following
month.
The BLUF publishes, for each variable, individual and mean ( “consensus”) forecasts. The mean
is taken over all forecasters participating in that month. Forecasts are made for several quarters into the
future. For each horizon forecasters are asked to forecast the average value of that variable during the
future quarter in question. Note that the realized value of any variable for the quarter in which forecasts
are released is not known at forecasting time since such data is available only after the quarter ends. As a
result, each set of forecasts includes “current quarter” forecast which is denoted by the horizon  h = 0.
Hence,  h = 1 means “the quarter following the quarter in which the forecasts were made.”  The BLUF
publication was initiated in 1983:01 and circulated forecast data with horizons of h = 0,1,...,4 quarters.
The initial version of the files provided data for the Fed Fund rate, 1- month Commercial Paper rate, 3-
month T-Bill rate, 30 - year Treasury Bonds rate, AAA long term corporate bonds rate, growth rates of
GDP, changes in the GDP deflator and CPI. In 1988:01 the BLUF added  individual and market mean
forecasts to complete the yield curve on treasury securities covering also maturities of  6 months, 1 year,
2 years, 5 years and 10 years. In 1997:01 the forecast horizon was expanded by one quarter and from
that date h = 0,1,...,5 quarters. Hence, a uniform panel data set for the entire term structure of interest
rates is available starting in 1988:01. The data set has undergone other minor changes since its first
release but these are not relevant to this paper and are thus not reported here.
In the estimation of the effect of market belief on risk premia we use the month as a unit of time.
Hence, our first task was to translate quarterly mean market forecasts to monthly forecasts. This was
accomplished by an interpolation procedure which selected for each date t and for each variable the B-
form of a least squares cubic spline piecewise polynomial which  minimized the squared deviations from
the given forecasts. When a variable is available on a monthly basis then all forecasters actually know at
each date t the realized monthly variable at hand for those months of the present quarter which have
already past. This clearly applies to all interest rate data. Hence, it was useful to include in all
interpolations past realized data of the variable in question for one quarter before date t (hence, three
monthly observations). This procedure improves continuity at date t. An optimal polynomial is computed
for each date and utilizes no future market data of any kind. At the end of the interpolation we have
monthly data with monthly forecast horizons h=1,2,...,12.
5 A similar definition was used by Fan (2006) who constructed similar belief data for the study of the dynamics of the
term structure. 
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The forecasts reported in BLUF are labeled by their release date, which is the start of each
month. Hence, these forecasts are conditional on information available at the moment the forecasts were
collected which is the end of the month previous to release. For example, data released  in 1988:01 is 
recorded in our “sample period” as 1987:12 since the data released on January 1, 1988 is based on
information available to forecasters at a date identified by us as 1987:12. Therefore all dates in this paper
should be considered as identified with the end of the month. The data set has been updated in a format
suitable for computations up to 2003:11.
2.2 Extracting Market States of Belief
The concepts of individual and market states of belief are at the foundation of the theory
developed in Section 1. These are central to the empirical work and we now explain how they are
constructed. For any variable X denote by  agent i’s conditional forecast of  at date t andE it {Xt%h} Xt%h
by  the forecast under the stationary probability m. Agent i’s state of belief about  is thenE mt {Xt%h} Xt%h
defined by  
5 .Z(X,h,i)t ' E
i
t {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}
The subtraction of  ensures the state of belief is m-orthogonal to information in the market atE mt {Xt%h}
t. Also, since is the deviation from the stationary forecast, it must be interpreted properly. ForZ(X,h,i)t
example suppose  y is the growth rate of GDP. When  the agent is “optimistic” about futureZ(y,h ,i)t > 0
growth but it does not mean he believes output will necessarily go up. He does believe output will grow
faster than “normal,” defined by the growth rate under the stationary forecast. Since here we study risk
premia, all belief variables examined in this paper are beliefs about future interest rates. The market
state of belief is defined by 
 Z(X,h)t '
1
N j
N
i'1
[ E it {Xt%h} & E
m
t {Xt%h} ] ' E¯t{Xt%h} & E
m
t {Xt%h}
and the cross sectional variance of beliefs is
(σt
(X,h))2'
1
Nj
N
i'1
[E it {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}]& [E¯t {Xt%h}&E
m
t {Xt%h}]
2
'
1
Nj
N
i'1
E it {Xt%h}& E¯t {Xt%h}
2
.
Since is the average forecast, reflects the market’s views of economic conditions whichE¯t{Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
are different at t from past average. These differences are the reason why the market forecasts
and not . “Optimism” or “pessimism” depend upon the context. For example,E¯t{Xt%h} E
m
t {Xt%h}
6  The data is publically available on Watson’s webpage   http://www.wws.princeton.edu/mwatson/publi.html  
7  We excluded 4 housing permit time series due to missing data. For natural reasons we also excluded the
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment data.
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 means the market is optimistic about abnormally high output growth in  t+h. If  is  jZ(y,h)t > 0 R
(j)
maturity  interest rate, then  means the market expects this rate to be higher than normal at t+h.Z(j ,h)t > 0
The market belief about Fed Funds rates is a belief about future monetary policy. Hence, Z(F,h)t > 0
means the market expects an abnormally tight monetary policy.
To measure we need data on the two components which define it. BLUF files provideZ(X,h)t
direct data on  and as discussed. We have monthly forecast data on interest rates atE it {Xt%h} E¯t{Xt%h}
different maturities, GDP growth , change in the CPI and the GDP deflator. The key issue is thus the
construction of the stationary forecasts . These forecasts are made with a model that takesE mt {Xt%h}
into account all data that was available at date t hence we take into account the release date of each
variable used in the following analysis. A feature of stationarity is time invariance, implying the model is
valid out of sample. This is an idealization which we can only approximate, given the relatively limited
data set which we have.  We thus compute employing the Stock and Watson’s (1999),E mt {Xt%h}
(2001), (2002), (2005) method of diffusion indices. We briefly explain this procedure.
We started with the Stock and Watson’s data set6 developed by Data Resources and Global
Insight. It contains 215 monthly time series for the US from 1959:01 to 2003:12, covering the main
sectors of the economy. Series of real variables are transformed by taking the monthly first difference of
their logarithms. Time series of prices are defined to be the second difference of the logarithms of the
initial prices. Because of missing data we use (see Stock and Watson (2005)) only 1267 series from
1959:01 to 2003:12. These 126 time series represent nine main categories of economic variables:
consumption, employment, exchange rates, housing starts, interest rates, money aggregates, prices, real
output, and stock prices. Stacking them, we obtain an information matrix of dimension 540 by 126. One
of Stock and Watson’s (1999) conclusion is that effective time invariant models needs to employ a small
number of variables. The reason for this observation is that linear forecasting models with a large
number of variables are unstable and forecast poorly out of sample. The Stock -Watson method reduces
the rank of the matrix but keeps as much information as possible by creating diffusion indices
constructed via principal component analysis to extract factors that best explain the variance of the
information matrix. 
8 Since the table reports the belief index about GDP growth we remark that to estimate belief variables aboutZ(X,h)t
real variables we use stationary forecasts which employ three factors. 
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For the entire period combined, the five greatest factors explain 43% of the variation in the
information matrix and with twenty factors the variance explained is 74%. However, the marginal
contribution of a factor declines rapidly implying that little marginal explanatory power is gained when
using more than a few factors. Indeed, since we study interest rates which are rather persistent, nothing
in this paper is changed by using more than one factor in the stationary forecasting scheme we adopt
below. Stock and Watson (2002) concluded that a combination of factors and lagged macro variables is
the best information set. To keep the number of variables small, our stationary forecasts of interest rates
are derived from a linear regression of a future variable on explanatory variables consisting of the
following: (i) one factor deduced from date t information matrix, (ii) lags of date t and t-1 values of the
variable in question, and (iii) dates t-1 and t-2 values of each of the year over year rates of change of
industrial production and the CPI.  The use of a factor also ensures that the information includes all
spreads in the yield curve since spreads are just linear combinations of interest rates and such spreads
receive significant weight in the factor employed.
Real Time vs. A Single Estimate. Had our data set been very long, the stationary forecast
 could be constructed from any long time interval. However, since our data set is short and weE mt {Xt%h}
examine the forecastability of excess returns, we do not use the factor loadings of a single model
estimated for the entire period 1959:01 to 2003:12 combined. Instead, all our estimates of E mt {Xt%h}
and are made by using real time forecasts. For each date in the sample we thus use data fromZ(X,h)t
1959:01 up to the given date in order to recompute the factor loadings, reestimate a stationary model
with which we compute  and then deduce the values of .E mt {Xt%h} Z
(X,h)
t
Tables 1A and 1B provide some summary statistics of a sample of extracted market belief
variables  8.  The last column  in Table 1A reports the first order autocorrelation parameter.Z(X,h)t ρt&1
Although theory requires each market belief to have a long term time average equal to zero, it is clear
the means over short time periods are not zero. Indeed, the fact that the belief indices for inflation and
nominal interest rates have positive time averages for the period at hand is significant. It reflects the
forecasting bias in the US during that era when beliefs in inflation and doubts about the efficacy of
monetary policy persisted (see Kurz (2005)) despite the growing evidence against these beliefs.
29
Table 1A: Summary Statistics of Market Beliefs
h = 6 Months or 2 Quarters  Ahead Time Ave. Std Dev Skew Kurt
ρt&1
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
CPI 
Real GDP % ch.
 0.215
 0.177
 0.080
-1.501
0.451
0.294
0.744
0.609
-0.195
0.224
 0.452
 0.002
2.554
2.661
3.573
2.817
0.459
0.648
0.637
0.801
h = 12 Months  or 4 Quarters Ahead
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
CPI
Real GDP % ch.
 0.343
 0.337
 0.060
-1.583
0.615
0.423
0.878
0.564
 0.028
 0.388
 0.380
 0.370
2.304
2.651
2.970
2.462
0.564
0.701
0.728
0.837
Table 1B: Correlation Matrix of  Market Beliefs
6 Months or 2 Quarters Ahead Fed Fund rate 1 year T-bill rate CPI Real GDP % ch.
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
CPI
Real GDP % ch.
 1.000
 0.896
 0.472
 0.033
 1.000
 0.543
 0.032
 1.000
-0.077 1.000
12 Months or 4 Quarters Ahead
Fed Fund rate
1 year T-bill rate
CPI
Real GDP % ch.
 1.000
 0.919
 0.707
-0.331
 1.000
 0.773
-0.223
 1.000
-0.388 1.000
Figure 1 traces the graph of the extracted for the 6-months T-bill rate with the two horizons h = 4,Z(6 ,h)t
12. The figure shows the belief index exhibits large fluctuations ranging from -0.5% to +1.5%. which are
very significant from the economic point of view. 
FIGURE 1
Figure 2 traces the time variability of the cross-sectional standard deviations of the  across i,σt
(6 ,h) Z(6 ,h ,i)t
for horizons h = 4, 12. It is clear from the figure that the dispersion of beliefs increases with the
forecasting horizon. This is a common feature of all data on belief distributions.   
FIGURE 2
2.3 Data on Realized Market Interest Rates, Rates of Return and Excess Returns
Treasury Bills market.  Theory suggests we work with interest rates implied by zero coupon
9 Traders are required to put up good faith security deposit which is a margin collateral to ensure they honor their
pledge for the deposit as agreed. The collateral securities are owned by the parties to the contract who continue to benefit from
any return to their investments. Margin cash is often held in the form of T Bills which yield interest to the owner. Hence a
buyer or seller of a futures contract do not have any investment or opportunity cost except for the risk they take on the actual
Fed Funds rate that would prevail at settlement. In this sense this market permits agents to trade risk of future monetary policy
actions.  
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bond prices hence we used data on zero coupon securities with maturities of 1 to 18 months, based on
the Fama-Bliss file (see Fama and Bliss (1987)). The data up to 2003:11 was generated by a FORTRAN
routines (provided by R.R. Bliss), using a method developed by Bliss for the unsmoothed Fama - Bliss
data set (see Bliss (1997)). Let  be the one period excess holding returns of T Bills with (j + h)Q (j,h)t%h
maturity held for  h periods and sold at maturity  j. It can be measured as a monthly or an annualized rate
since all we say here about T Bills is independent of the unit of time selected. We study the h - month
excess holding returns defined by 
hQ (j,h)t%h ' (j%h)R
(j%h)
t & jR
(j)
t%h & hR
(h)
t
where is the one period interest rate implied by a zero coupon bond with maturity at τ. We study theR (τ)t
two maturities j = 3 and 6 months. All data on the right hand side of the expression are then available in
the Fama-Bliss file described above. The limiting factor in the study of this market is the BLUF data
hence the period of analysis is 1987:12- 2003:11.
Federal Fund Futures market. The second set of markets are for non contingent Federal Funds
futures contracts with diverse monthly settlement horizons. A Fed Funds futures contract enables buyers
and sellers to trade the risk of the Fed Funds rate that would be realized at the time of settlement. Hence
this is actually the risk of the future target of the Fed Fund rate that would be fixed by the Fed’s FOMC.
Fed funds futures have traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) since October 1988 and
settle based on the mean Fed fund rate that prevails over a specified calendar month. The mean is
calculated as the simple average of the daily averages published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Hence, a trader in this market needs to forecast the average federal fund rate during the contract
month. The contract horizon is the number of months prior to the settlement date when a trader
commits to go long or short such futures contract. Contracts are settled by cash by the end of the
contract month. Keep in mind that traders of such contracts do not invest capital and do not incur any
opportunity cost9; they commit at date t to a contract rate which becomes the contract cost basis atF (h)t
settlement, h  months later.  h = 3 means a three-month-ahead  contract horizon. Data on are thenF (h)t
10 The CBOT uses the 360 day year as the basic convention for quotation of interest rate and conversion from annual
to monthly rates. The CBOT provides more details on its web page.
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recorded by the exchange and become public information. Let us now explain the risks and rewards of a
trader in this market.
The trader with a long position (the “buyer”) of a Fed Funds futures contract owns a contract
under which an interest rate of is paid on a $5 million deposit for a month during month t + h. isF (h)t F
(h)
t
quoted as an annual rate. Denote by  the actual average annualized Fed Funds rate during settlementR (F)t%h
month, h  months later. Let  n  be the number of days in the contract month then at settlement a seller
pays and a buyer receives for each contract the cash amount10 
.$Profits ' [ F (h)t & R
(F)
t%h]×
n
360
×$5,000,000
It is then clear the parties trade the risk of  which is the risk of the rate set by the Open MarketR (F)t%h
Committee. It is reasonable to define the excess return of any gamble in this market to be defined by 
 .Q (F,h)t%h ' F
(h)
t & R
(F)
t%h
Data on   is recorded by CBOT while data on  is reported by the Federal Reserve. Given theF (h)t R
(F)
t%h
data set available the period for analysis of this market is 1988:10- 2003:11.
The problem of serial correlation.  The presence of serial correlation in the forecast errors is inevitable
for a well known reason. Computation of excess returns entail overlapping data and this fact leads us to
report, in all work below, robust standard errors of all estimates. We compute standard error using the
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) procedure for robust estimates developed by Hodrick
(1992), and which generalizes the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) method. This correction places full weight
over the lags of serial correlation in excess returns. Hence we compute HAC robust standard errors with
h-1 lags.
3. Analysis of the Risk Premium in the Bond and Federal Fund Futures Markets
3.1 Estimating Excess Returns
In this Section we study and measure of the contribution of market belief to long term
forecasting excess returns and hence to market risk premia. More specifically, we test the validity of the
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theoretical conclusions (26a)-(26b) about the effect of market belief on the time variability of risk
premia. Excess holding returns on three assets are studied: three month Treasury Bills and six month
Treasury Bills with holding periods from 1 to 12 moths, and Federal Funds Futures contracts with
holding periods of 1 to 6 months. We thus estimate linear excess return functions of the following
general form
(27)  Q (X,h)t%h 'α
(X,h)
0 %α
(X,h)
1 Mt%α
(X,h)
2 Bt%ε
(X,h)
t%h
where  is a vector of macroeconomic variables and  is a vector of market belief variables to beMt Bt
specified. We stress, at the outset, that it follows from the definition of individual state of belief
that belief variables are m-orthogonal to all information in . Since the risk premium isZ(X,h,i)t Mt
estimated in (27) using the long term statistics, under which  and  are orthogonal, it follows thatBt Mt
variables in  add something new which is not in the market data . Bt Mt
To specify  and  note that under an exponential utility the risk premium is a function of theBt Mt
mean market belief only; no other moments matter. For more general utility functions the entire
distribution matters and we thus take into account additional moments of this distribution. To that end
we study below the following three variables about any asset X:
 –  date t  mean market belief about X at future date t+h&Z (X,h)t
 –  date t cross section standard deviations of individual belief about X at future date t+hσ(X,h)t
 – date t mean market belief about the slope of the yield curve at  t+h.&SZ (6&F,h)t '& (Z
(6,h)
t &Z
(F,h)
t )
The first and second variables are clear: they are simply the first two moments of the distribution of
individual beliefs. Note the negative sign in . It results from our convention to describe belief as in&Z (X,h)t
(14a)-(14c). All belief variables are oriented so their sign in perception of future asset payoff is positive.
A positive belief is perceived beneficial to a long position. Since a belief in a higher future interest rate is
a belief in a lower future price of a debt instrument, a belief which is beneficial to the long position is a
belief in lower rather than higher interest rates. 
The inclusion of the third variable is motivated by two considerations. First, the risk premia on
holding interest bearing assets are interdependent. Hence, even with fixed market belief about the
riskiness of three month Bills the risk premium on holding this asset is likely to be affected by beliefs
about change in the slope of the yield curve. Second, although we study the holding return of say, a six
month bill, a speculative motive to trade the asset earlier could be affected by the possibility of changes
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in the slope of the yield curve. Given that the current Federal Funds rate will be a variable in all
equations, a steeper yield curve is not beneficial to the long positions in any debt instrument hence again
the negative sign in .&SZ (6&F,h)t
The macroeconomic variables in  are natural and reflect the literature on excess return on debtMt
instruments and futures markets as noted in the introductory section. First, following Piazzesi and
Swanson (2004) who concentrated on the cyclical variable, we use the following three macroeconomic
variables in estimating risk premium in the Federal Funds futures market:
 - lagged year over year growth of Non Farm Payroll;NFPt&1
 - lagged year over year change in the consumer price index ;CPIt&1
Ft  -   the Federal Funds rate, reflecting the state of monetary policy at t.
We turn to the issue of past yields. In studying bond yields  Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) stressed the
predictive power of past yields. Thus, we use yield variables in assessing the risk premium in markets for
3 month and 6 month Treasury Bills. We introduce data on yields of Treasuries with 18 maturities
covering the period 1970:01 to 2003:11. To reduce the dimension of the information we computed
principal components in real time (i.e. for each t, employ only data up to t) and in all estimates we use
the first three factors with notation , υ =1,2,3. These three factors account for 98% of the totalR Fυt
variance of the yields’ information matrix.
Up to now the time unit chosen did not matter. However, for the equations in (27) the time over
which excess return are measured does matter. Rates of return on holding T Bills are naturally annual
rates and hence comparable across different T Bills and horizons. As to Fed Funds futures, we measure
total returns on such futures in percentage points for the length of time the contracts are held. Naturally,
returns on short duration contracts are typically smaller than returns on long duration contracts. It is
then clear that returns on a gamble of buying Fed Funds futures are not entirely comparable with returns
on holding an asset with clearly defined holding cost. This lack of comparability should be kept in mind
in assessing the results reported below. Tables 2A-2C present the estimates of equation (27) for the
three market at hand and for selected horizons.  (*) denotes significance at 10% level and (†) denotes
significance at 5% level. We report adjusted .R 2
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          Table 2A: Federal Fund Futures Market - Time Variability of Excess Returns
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft σ
(F,h)
t Z
(F,h)
t SZ
(6&F,h)
t R
2
Chow
Test
p-value
h=2  0.009
(0.063)
-0.035 *
(0.020)
 0.013
(0.033)
-0.001
(0.018)
 0.454
(0.277)
-0.134 *
(0.078)
-0.063
(0.109)
0.095  0.001
h=4  0.031
(0.121)
-0.147 †
(0.043)
 0.089 *
(0.053)
 0.042
(0.041)
-1.006 *
(0.511)
-0.582 †
(0.126)
-0.821 †
(0.231)
0.279 0.001
h=6 -0.173
(0.129)
-0.224 †
(0.043)
 0.155 *
(0.080)
 0.115 †
(0.047)
-1.164 †
(0.483)
-0.936 †
(0.224)
-1.674 †
(0.562)
0.441 0.000
                Table 2B: 3 Months Treasury Bills Market - Time Variability of Excess Returns
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(3,h)
t Z
(3,h)
t SZ
(6&F,h)
t R
2 ChowTest
p-value
h=2  1.695 *
(0.868)
-0.127 †
(0.050)
 0.075
(0.060)
-0.182
(0.122)
 0.681 *
(0.397)
-0.056
(0.087)
-0.088
(0.075)
 0.628
(0.504)
-0.536 †
(0.176)
 0.008
(0.183)
0.186  0.004
h=4  1.785 †
(0.665)
-0.181 †
(0.032)
 0.071
(0.050)
-0.132
(0.104)
 0.716 †
(0.319)
-0.030
(0.068)
-0.071
(0.058)
-0.662
(0.421)
-0.390 †
(0.138)
-0.213
(0.157)
0.288 0.013
h=6  1.244 †
(0.503)
-0.160 †
(0.028)
 0.111 †
(0.051)
-0.081
(0.076)
 0.567 †
(0.237)
 0.057
(0.060)
-0.090 *
(0.052)
-0.786 †
(0.270)
-0.571 †
(0.146)
-0.684 †
(0.199)
0.461 0.035
h=8  1.891 †
(0.578)
-0.146 †
(0.030)
 0.093 †
(0.042)
-0.162 †
(0.077)
 0.885 †
(0.272)
 0.059
(0.058)
-0.039
(0.047)
-0.499 †
(0.220)
-0.470 †
(0.109)
-0.430 †
(0.161)
0.553 0.025
h=10  1.571 †
(0.486)
-0.155 †
(0.026)
 0.068 †
(0.033)
-0.048
(0.066)
 0.690 †
(0.248)
-0.019
(0.037)
-0.034
(0.041)
-0.779 †
(0.211)
-0.369 †
(0.104)
-0.323 †
(0.150)
0.643 0.048
h=12  1.609 †
(0.568)
-0.174 †
(0.023)
 0.072 †
(0.032)
-0.058
(0.084)
 0.659 †
(0.292)
-0.051
(0.037)
-0.018
(0.030)
-0.623 †
(0.066)
-0.257 †
(0.081)
-0.135
(0.111)
0.666 0.005
            Table 2C: 6 Months Treasury Bills Market - Time Variability of Excess Returns
Constant NFPt&1 CPIt&1 Ft R
F1
t&1 R
F2
t&1 R
F3
t&1 σ
(6,h)
t Z
(6,h)
t SZ
(6&F,h)
t R
2 ChowTest
p-value
h=2  3.525 *
(1.902)
-0.353 †
(0.105)
 0.108
(0.125)
-0.361 
(0.273)
 1.510 *
(0.879)
-0.100
(0.191)
-0.121
(0.161)
 1.705 
(1.221)
-0.945 †
(0.431)
-0.021
(0.416)
0.179 0.144
h=4  3.766 †
(1.474)
-0.445 †
(0.079)
 0.122
(0.113)
-0.280
(0.218)
 1.567 †
(0.690)
-0.064
(0.121)
-0.100
(0.110)
-0.850
(0.919)
-0.856 †
(0.317)
-0.522
(0.354)
0.317 0.215
h=6  2.717 †
(1.185)
-0.338 †
(0.079)
 0.235 †
(0.095)
-0.145
(0.162)
 1.197 †
(0.546)
 0.036
(0.114)
-0.167
(0.123)
-2.430 †
(0.548)
-1.504 †
(0.290)
-1.481 †
(0.411)
0.521 0.006
h=8  3.388 †
(1.358)
-0.375 †
(0.076)
 0.125 
(0.086)
-0.150
(0.188)
 1.509 †
(0.683)
-0.047
(0.104)
-0.059
(0.099)
-1.424 †
(0.503)
-0.913 †
(0.221)
-0.692 †
(0.306)
0.586 0.003
h=10  3.858 †
(1.234)
-0.365 †
(0.065)
 0.121 *
(0.063)
-0.195
(0.171)
 1.677 †
(0.633)
-0.100
(0.078)
-0.059
(0.080)
-1.368 †
(0.493)
-0.708 †
(0.206)
-0.505 
(0.332)
0.644 0.003
h=12  3.992 †
(1.166)
-0.371 †
(0.058)
 0.129 †
(0.064)
-0.233
(0.162)
 1.648 †
(0.588)
-0.140 *
(0.073)
-0.001
(0.057)
-1.094 †
(0.277)
-0.520 †
(0.196)
-0.157
(0.267)
0.667 0.010
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3.2 Evaluating the Results
Looking at Tables (2A)-(2C) together we find that the pro-cyclical variable NFP advocated by
Piazzesi and Swanson (2004), and the yield variables used by Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) are,
indeed, important for long term forecasts of excess returns. We note however that only the first factor
of past yields is consistently significant.  The central question is the size and sign of the belief 
variables. We find that the effect of market belief is large, significant and universally compatible with
the theoretical predictions. This constitutes an empirical support for the hypothesis that like society at
large, markets are moved by perceptions. Fluctuations of real pro-cyclical variables are partly
responsible for  variability of risk premia but variations in market perceptions, which may express
mistaken forecasts of future interest rates, are equally important. The data supports the Market Risk
Premium hypothesis in (26b). Keeping in mind the orientation convention the data reveals the
parameters of the mean market beliefs  in Tables 2A-2C are always negative and(&Z (X,h)t ,&SZ
(6&F,h)
t )
are key contributors to the high . Parameters of   are large and always statisticallyR2 &Z (X,h)t
significant. Those of are significant mostly for longer holding periods when an investor&SZ (6&F,h)t
holds bonds of longer maturities. For example, to sell a six month Treasury Bill 12 month from now
you must buy a Treasury Bond with maturity of 18 months which you see 12 month from now. Such
investments are more sensitive to changes in the slope of the yield curve.
The parameters of  which measure market diversity, are significant and negative forσ(X,h)t ,
longer horizons and we now explore the effect of . For all h > 2 the coefficients of areσ(X,h)t σ
(X,h)
t
negative and large. To interpret this result we observe it says that an increase in diversity of market
opinions decreases the risk premium. This same conclusion was derived earlier in theoretical work
using simulations (see Kurz and Motolese (2001)). It reveals that markets with large diversity of
beliefs are more stable since beliefs tend to cancel each other, resulting in reduced volatility and lower
market risk. In essence, with increased diversity the effects of the law of large numbers is more
pronounced over time. The converse is also true: markets are more risky the higher is the degree of
unanimity in them. This is so since any change of market belief results in sharp change of prices when
too many people try to get through the same door. The negative coefficient of says that lowerσ(X,h)t
risk premia are priced into markets with more diverse beliefs. Finally, keeping in mind the limitation
of we present in Table 3 the contribution of belief variables to the .R 2 R 2
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Table  3: Contribution of Belief Data to Excess Returns Predictability
Asset Horizon  Without Beliefs  With BeliefsR 2 R 2
Fed Fund Futures h=2
h=4
h=6
0.061
0.201
0.345
0.095
0.279
0.441
3 Months T-Bill h=2
h=4
h=6
h=8
h=10
h=12
0.122
0.256
0.367
0.460
0.541
0.595
0.186
0.288
0.461
0.553
0.643
0.666
6 Months T-Bill h=2
h=4
h=6
h=8
h=10
h=12
0.131
0.290
0.389
0.502
0.558
0.600
0.179
0.317
0.521
0.586
0.644
0.667
To sum up our findings, pro-cyclical fundamental variables are important since they are used, to some
extent, to forecast the onset of recessions. But, as Samuelson liked to quip, markets will forecasted
11 of the next  5 recessions! Our theory captures some of the 6 other recessions which the market will
predict but that will not happen. 
Figures 3-5 exhibit the fitted and realized excess holding returns for a sample of three of our
models, in accord with the estimates in Tables 2A-2C. The figures show that the results for Fed Funds
futures are less precise than the results for T Bills. However, we note the great success of our
estimated model in predicting the turning points of the time series. This high accuracy is the crucial
contribution of the belief variables in capturing the time variability of the market’s perceived  risk
premia. One may also note that the belief variables enable the fitted values to match the realized data
at high frequency within the broader cyclical pattern. 
FIGURE 3  – FIGURE 5
What is the order of magnitude of these premia? To measure the magnitude of the market belief
premium in basis points we provide the following information. For T Bills with short horizons  h = 2
the values of during the sample period range from -35 to  +142 basis points. For h > 2 it rises,Z (j,h)t
so that at h = 6 it is from -68 to +117 and when h = 12 the ranges is about  -68 to +160. For Z (F,h)t
the range at h = 2 is from -48 to +95 basis points and for h > 2 it rises, reaching at h =6 the range of -
90 to +123. In general, for any given horizon the volatility of is greater than the volatility ofZ (F,h)t
for T Bills. As to the effect of diversity,  the standard deviation of is about 8 -14 basisZ (j,h)t σ
(X,h)
t
points  for Fed Funds and 8 - 18 for T Bills. To illustrate the marginal effects of the belief variables
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we compute the following examples:
If  takes 2/3 of its maximal value in the sample the premium changes by +76 basis pointsZ (F,6)t
If  takes 2/3 of its minimal value in the sample the premium changes by -56 basis pointsZ (F,6)t
If  takes 2/3 of its maximal value in the sample the premium changes by +44 basis pointsZ (3,6)t
If  takes 2/3 of its minimal value in the sample the premium changes by -26 basis pointsZ (3,6)t
If  takes 2/3 of its maximal value in the sample the premium changes by +117 basis pointsZ (6,6)t
If  takes 2/3 of its minimal value in the sample the premium changes by -68 basis points.Z (6,6)t
The distributions of the belief variables as realized over time is far from symmetric; they all
tend to have large tails. For example   has skewness of 1.14 and kurtosis of 6.04 and  hasZ (3,6)t Z
(F,6)
t
skewness of -0.20 and kurtosis of 2.68. Nevertheless we present in Table 4 their measured standard
deviations during the applicable sample period. Together with the results in Tables 2A-2C the reader
can assess the effects of marginal changes in these variables in terms of their standard deviations. For
example, suppose for h = 6 we have an increase of   by two standard deviations. In that case theZ (6,6)t
risk premium rises by (see Table 2C) 1.504×64 = + 96.26  basis points. 
Table 4: Standard Deviations of Belief Variables (in basis points)
σ
(F,h)
t σ
(3,h)
t σ
(6,h)
t Z
(F,h)
t Z
(3,h)
t Z
(6,h)
t SZ
(6&F,h)
t
h=2
h=4
h=6
h=8
h=10
h=12
7.8
 10.6
 14.1
----
----
----
8.4
11.2
14.4
16.8
18.5
18.4
8.4
11.1
13.8
16.3
17.7
17.9
23.9
38.8
45.1
----
----
----
26.1
28.8
33.6
35.2
42.7
46.7
27.1
28.5
32.0
35.4
44.1
48.1
18.4
15.9
17.4
19.5
20.3
22.2
Non- Stationarity. Our theory hinges on the fact that agents do not know the true structure of the
economy since the economy exhibits non-stationarity. In that case the risk the excess return function
will have to exhibit non-stationarity as well. To test for parameter time variability we could select
dates when structural changes are considered. Our view is that forecast functions change for many
reasons and practically any date will do for a Chow test. Since the periods 1988:10- 2003:11 for Fed
Funds and 1987:12- 2003:11 for T Bills are relatively short, we chose the mid-points of 1996:04 and
1995:11 to maximize the number of observations per period. For these periods we estimate (27) and
conduct Chow tests of parameter time variability. In Tables 2A-2C we report parameter estimates for
the entire periods and p-values of Chow tests for parameter time variability. All Chow tests lead to a
rejection of the hypothesis of structural parameter time invariance in all markets. The Chow tests
are particularly significant since we have only 91 observations for Fed Futures and 96 for T Bills in
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each of the sub periods. 
4. Conclusions and Final Comments
Excess volatility of asset returns, above and beyond the level warranted by fundamental
forces, is a fact contested by only very few economists. In earlier work cited above we have shown
via simulations how the dynamics of belief impacts the dynamics of asset pricing. In this paper we
focus on market risk premia. We first set up a model of asset pricing with heterogenous beliefs and
derive an analytical expression for the risk premium of a risky asset over the riskless rate. We find
two effects.  A direct effect on risk premia, via the effect of market belief on market volatility, which
is a constant premium. A second effect which we call “the market belief risk premium” varies over
time and is rather surprising in nature. We show that the risk premium  is decreasing in theE mt [πt%1]
mean market belief  . This result means that when the market holds abnormally favorable beliefZt
about future payoffs of an asset, the market views the long position in that asset as less risky.  In that
case the long term risk premium awarded the long position in that asset is reduced. Fluctuating
market beliefs thus imply time variability of risk premia but more important, fluctuations in risk
premia are inversely related to the degree of market optimism about future prospects of the asset in
question. Equipped with a detailed panel data on individual forecasts of interest rates our theory
proposes a specific way in which we should deduce the appropriate panel data on market belief. Using
such data we then test our theory empirically in the markets for Federal Funds Futures, 3 month
Treasury Bills and 6 month Treasury Bills. We show that the data supports the theory and the
estimated effect varies across markets and holding periods but is, generally, very large.
The strong effects of market belief on market risk premia has thus two important implications.
First, it offers an alternative way of showing (for those who have any doubt) that fundamental
factors affect market dynamics but perception is equally important for market volatility. Second, that
market belief is actually an observable data which can be used for a deeper understanding of the
basic causes of stochastic volatility and time variability of risk premia. 
Although the theory is framed in terms of beliefs in state variables which impact the price of
an asset, our data on interest rates forecasts, are actually superior. This is so since such forecasts sum
up all state variables which could have affected interest rates and which we could have missed. That
is, suppose we had a list of state variables which could impact interest rates and suppose we deduced
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all market beliefs about these state variables. We would then find that these market beliefs are heavily
correlated and this fact would actually make it harder for us to test our theory. In addition, the data
would never be able to capture all the relevant state variables affecting interest rates. We thus
conclude that good quality data on the distribution of market forecasts of prices is needed for any
future research in this area. Indeed, BLUF has not collected forecast data on stock prices and we
have not been able to find a consistent, satisfactory panel data on stock price forecasts. As a result, it
has not been possible for us to carry out on stock market returns the test done in this paper for
Treasury Securities and Federal Funds futures. Nevertheless, in future research we hope to explore
other dimensions of the data.
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APPENDIX
The problem is formulated as follows:
Wt%1 ' (Wt & Ct)R % θt Qt%1
   ,  Qt%1 ' pt%1 % dt%1 & ptR % µ , dt ' Dt & µ ψt ' (1 , dt , zt , gt )
dt%1 ' λddt % λ
d
ggt % g
d
t%1
,    ,   Zt%1 ' λzZt % λ
z
ggt % g
z
t%1 Λ
ψ
'
1 , 0 , 0 , 0
0 ,λd , 0 , λ
d
g
0 , 0 , λz , λ
z
g
0 ,0 , 0 , λz
gˆt' (1 ,g
d
t ,g
z
t ,g
g
t ) , (g
d
t ,g
z
t ,g
g
t ) - N(0 , Σ)
gt%1 ' λzgt % g
g
t%1
We also keep in mind the simpler notation
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  ,     Λ '
λd , 0 , λ
d
g
0 , λz , λ
z
g
0 , 0 , λz
V '
v00 , v01 , v02 , v03
v01
v02 V11
v03
'
v00 , vˆ
T
0
vˆ0 , V11
Hence we have  ,        where    is a 4×4 matrix
ψt%1 ' Λψψt % Λggt%1 Λg '
0 , 0
0 , I(3×3)
We assume that  pt ' ad dt % az zt % P0
Computing excess return in terms of the state variables we have that 
Qt%1' (ad % 1) [λddt%λ
d
g gt%g
d
t%1]%az [λzZt%λ
z
ggt%g
z
t%1]%P0 & [ad dt%az Zt%P0]R % µ
Hence
Qt%1' [(ad % 1)λd&Rad] dt % [azλz&Raz]Zt% [(ad%1)λ
d
g % azλ
z
g]gt% [P0 (1&R)%µ]% [(ad%1)g
d
t%1%azg
d
t%1]
Or,
Qt%1 ' a
T
ψt % bˆ
T
gt%1 , hence Et[Qt%1] ' a
T
ψt
where
a T' ([P0 (1&R)%µ] , [(ad % 1)λd&Rad] , [azλz&Raz] , [(ad%1)λ
d
g % azλ
z
g]) , bˆ
T
' ( 0, (ad%1) ,az ,0)
and also we shall use the notation    .  Now compute the expressionb T' ( (ad%1) , az ,0)
&αWt%1&
1
2
ψ
T
t%1Vψt%1'&α( Wt&Ct )R&αθt[a
T
ψt% bˆ
T
gˆt%1]&
1
2
ψ
T
t Λ
T
ψ
VΛ
ψ
ψt&ψ
T
t Λ
T
ψ
VΛ
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T
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VΛ
g
gˆt%1
Algebra and simplification leads to the conclusion that we have 
&αWt%1&
1
2
ψ
T
t%1 Vψt%1' &At & e
T
t gt%1 &
1
2
g
T
t%1 V11gt%1
where 
At ' α( Wt&Ct )R % αθt a
T
ψt %
1
2
ψ
T
t Λ
T
ψ
VΛ
ψ
ψt
 (this is a 3 vector) where (3x4) matrix,  e Tt ' [αθtb
T
% ψ
T
t Λ
T
0] Λ
T
0 '
vˆ T0
Λ
TV11
Λ0' v0 , V11Λ
It is now well known that the Bellman Equation for this problem with  isγ ' 1
τ
Jt ' Max
(θt , Ct )
[&βt&1exp &γCt & β
tEt exp &At & e
T
t gt%1 &
1
2
g
T
t%1 V11gt%1
But we know that
.Et exp &At & e
T
t gt%1 &
1
2
g
T
t%1 V11gt%1 ' |1%ΣV11|
&
1
2 exp[
1
2
e Tt ( I % ΣV11 )
&1
Σet & At]
and also 
    1
2
e Tt (1%ΣV)
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Σet'
1
2
[αθtb
T
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T
t Λ
T
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T(I%ΣV11 )
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        .' 1
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T
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Hence, 
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Σet & At ' &α( Wt&Ct )R & αθt [a
T
&b TΩΛ0]ψt%
.% 1
2
α
2
θ
2
t b
T
Ωb & 1
2
ψ
T
t [Λ
T
ψ
VΛ
ψ
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T
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The first order conditions are then stated as follows. The derivative with respect to  θ   is
& α [a T&b TΩΛ0]ψt % α
2
θtb
T
Ωψt ' 0
And this proves equation (17) in the text
.θit '
1
αb TΩb
[a T&b TΩΛ0]ψt /
1
αb TΩb
[Et(Qt%1)%u
T
ψt , u
T
' &b TΩΛ0
We can also explain the “adjustment” to the variance in (17) since 
 
σˆ
2
Q ' b
T
Ωb
which is the variance of the excess return function where the covariance matrix used is not G but
rather Ω.
We now have 
.α2θi
2
t b
T
Ωb ' 1
b TΩb
ψ
T
t [a
T
&b TΩΛ0]
T [a T&b TΩΛ0]ψt
Hence the optimized value of the exponent is simply
1
2
e Tt (1%ΣV11 )
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Where
 .M ' 1
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T
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The derivative with respect to C
.γexp &γCt ' αRβ|1%ΣV11|
&
1
2 exp &α( Wt&Ct )R &
1
2
ψ
T
t Mψt , let G ' |1%ΣV11|
&
1
2
Hence the solution for C is
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γCt ' &log[
βαRG
γ
] % α(Wt&Ct)R %
1
2
ψ
T
t Mψt
or
.Ct ' &
1
γ % αR
log[ βαRG
γ
] % αR
γ % αR
Wt %
1
2(γ % αR)
ψ
T
t Mψt
The final details of showing that the value function is indeed the solution of the Bellman Equation
leads to the demonstration that the unknown parameter α and matrix V are determined by the
conditions 
(i) .  α ' rγ
R
(ii) .M
R
' V
FIGURES
Figure 1: 4 and 12 (dashed line) months ahead market beliefs of 6 months T-bill rate ( )Z (6)t
Figure 2: 4 and 12 (dashed line) months ahead standard deviations of market beliefs of 6 months T-bill rate ( )Z (6)t
Figure 3: Excess returns on Fed Fund Futures contract 6 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from
regression (27)
Figure 4: Excess returns on 3 Months T-Bill 12 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from regression
(27)
Figure 5: Excess returns on 6 Months T-Bill 12 months ahead. The dashed line represents the fitted values from regression
(27)
